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Abstract
China is now the world's second largest oil-consuming country after the U.S. Its 
global efforts to secure oil imports to meet increasing domestic demand have 
profound implications for international relations in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. 
China's rising oil demand and its external quest for oil have thus generated 
much attention. This paper looks at the possibility of China clashing with the 
U.S. and other Western countries over African oil interests.
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The Changing Pattern of China's Oil Supply and Demand
China was an oil-importing country after its founding in 1949. From 
1950 to 1959 China's annual import of oil increased from 0.33 million 
tons mts/year to 3.33 mts/year (Wang 2001). In the early 1960s when 
the Soviet Union ceased to provide assistance and oil to China, China 
experienced a serious oil shortage. This led to the exploration of Daqing 
oil ﬁeld. Production began at the Daqing ﬁeld in 1963. In 1965 the domes-
tic output of China's crude oil reached 10 mts/year or 97 percent of the 
country's oil needs (Wang 2001); China became self-sufﬁcient in oil.
The year 1993 was the turning-point in China's oil import and export 
situation. China became a net oil-importing country. China's demand for 
oil doubled in the space of a decade increasing from 3.3 million barrels 
per day (bpd) in 1995 to 6.6 million bpd in 2005. This was almost equiva-
lent to one third of U.S. demand (International Energy Agency 2006). 
From 2000 to 2005 China's energy consumption had risen 60 percent, 
accounting for almost half of the growth in world energy consumption. 
This situation prompted a fundamental reassessment of China's, and 
thus the world's, energy future. The IEA (International Energy Agency) 
has raised its China 2030 forecast by 1.2 billion tons of oil equivalent (a 
63 percent upward revision). This is more than India's total projected 
demand for that year (Figure 1). Under this scenario China will account 
for 20 percent of global energy demand, more than Europe and Japan 
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combined and will easily surpass the U.S. as the world's largest energy 
consumer.Yet, China's domestic oil supply has failed to keep pace with 
this increasing demand and the outlook for a substantial increase in 
domestic production is grim. Most of China's oil ﬁelds have reached 
production plateaus or will soon decline in output (Gillboy 2002). In-
creased output from ﬁelds in Western China and offshore is likely to 
only slightly offset production declines in China's oldest and largest oil 
ﬁelds in the Northeast, including the Daqing ﬁeld (Xu 2002).
The widening gap between China's domestic oil demand and supply 
indicates that it will be increasingly dependent on imported oil (Figure 
2). Based on the demand and supply projections I have noted, China's 
oil imports are expected to increase from about 3 million bpd in 2005 
to between 6 million and 11 million bpd in 2020, or some 60-80 percent 
of the country's total oil consumption (Downs 2006). 
Today's oil market is characterized by increasing state ownership and 
rising resource nationalism. Approximately 85 percent of oil traded is 
controlled by state oil companies owned by host governments. Con-
cession agreements, which used to be common, are now rare. Instead, 
producing states prefer to work with foreign oil companies. They tap 
the expertise, technical services and investment capital they offer.
FIGURE 1 Forecasts of China's Energy Demand (mtoe)
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China's 'Going Out' Strategy 
The dramatic increase in oil imports and increasing difﬁculties in secur-
ing an oil supply has aroused concern and has received attention from 
China's academic and policy-making communities. Chinese leaders 
realized that to participate in the global oil market China needs a secure 
oil supply and to build its capacity.  As early as 1992 the central govern-
ment put forward a strategic policy for developing China's oil industry 
'using two sorts of resources (domestic and overseas) and markets'. 
On January 1, 2001, Chen Jin Hua, former director of Chinese National 
Planning Committee, advocated  'establishing oil ﬁelds abroad' (Chen 
2001), or the 'going out' strategy.
China hopes to achieve two objectives with this 'going out' strategy. 
One is to encourage China's oil companies to follow in the footsteps of 
international oil companies in developing equity oil,1 and to look for 
income and rent from the upstream sector (exploration and production). 
The other is to create internationally competitive ﬁrms — especially in 
'pillar industries' — which can compete with the world's leading corpo-
rations, both in China and abroad. The Chinese leadership believe that 
China's future oil strategy will be inﬂuenced by the growing strength of 
its oil companies. To be more competitive globally, Chinese oil compa-
nies need to compete with international ﬁrms in world markets. Mean-
while, the 'going out' strategy will facilitate the export of oil-exploration 
equipment and other goods and will create and promote bilateral trade 
between China and host countries.
FIGURE 2  China's Oil Demand and Domestic Supply
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The decision to invest in oil exploration and production abroad was 
actually initiated by companies themselves. Among the three biggest 
Chinese oil companies,2 CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) 
was the ﬁrst to venture overseas. CNPC began to set its sights beyond 
China's borders in the late 1980s and announced in 1991 that interna-
tionalizing its operations was one of its long-term strategies. It made 
its ﬁrst overseas investment with the purchase of a stake in a United 
Nations sponsored oil sands development project in Alberta, Canada. 
In 1993 CNPC acquired the exploration right of Peru's Talara oil ﬁeld 
paying US$25 million (Zha 2005). From the later 1990s CNPC tilted its 
'going out strategy' toward Africa.
Since the late 1990s, China's policies towards Africa have been closely 
linked to the objectives of its major state-owned company, CNPC. China 
had invested in 27 major oil and natural gas projects in 14 African 
countries by the end of 2005. China's oil imports from Africa have been 
increasing at an annual rate of 30 percent, slightly higher than that from 
the rest of the world (26 percent). China imports oil mainly from Angola, 
Sudan, Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea, with Angola being 
the leading supplier of oil from Africa. In 2006 Angola accounted for 50 
percent of China's oil imports from Africa and narrowly overtook Saudi 
Arabia to become China's top crude oil supplier (Reuters News 2006).
China has also beneﬁted from its experience in Sudan. About 50 per-
cent of China's equity oil comes from Sudan, and 65 percent of Sudan's 
oil exports go to China (Petroleum Intelligence 2006). The number of 
FIGURE 3 China's Overseas Equity Oil Production and Imports, 2006
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Chinese workers in Sudan has tripled since the early 1990s reaching 
24,000 in 2006. Chinese non-oil investments are signiﬁcant as well, 
including hydro-electric facilities, a new airport for Khartoum, and 
several textile plants. China also operates the vast bulk of Sudan's oil 
production and has a 50 percent stake in the nation's only major reﬁnery 
in Khartoum (Lee 2007).
Factors for China's Oil Companies Going to Africa
The Persian Gulf and Asia-Paciﬁc regions were China's main sources of 
imported oil in the 1990s. In 1995, these two regions supplied almost 87 
percent of China's oil imports (Persian Gulf 46 percent, Asia-Paciﬁc 41 
percent). However, since the end of 1990s the importance of these two 
regions in China's oil imports has diminished. In 2006, the Asia Paciﬁc's 
portion declined to 8 percent, while the Persian gulf's portion hovered 
at 45 percent (ﬁgure 3). The Asia Paciﬁc region does not have the sup-
ply to meet China's oil import demand. Indonesia, the region's second 
FIGURE 4  China's Crude Imports by Region
 
largest oil producer (behind China) and once China's largest supplier 
(31 percent in 1995), is now a net oil importer.
The Persian Gulf will remain an important source of crude oil for 
China. However, the 9.11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the predominantly 
American 'war on terror' and the military interventions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, have all heightened China's sense of insecurity and vulnerabil-
ity. Beijing is concerned that Washington's reaction to the 9.11 terrorist 
attacks has further destabilized the already far from stable oil-producing 
regions of the Middle East and Central Asia. China has to diversify its 
energy import resources for the sake of oil security. China perceives the 
current oil production order and partnerships as entrenched. Over the 
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past ﬁve decades U.S., Japanese and European companies have forged 
relationships with key producing countries. Southeast Asia was under 
the exclusive control of Western powers during the colonial period. 
The oil-producing territories of Indonesia, Brunei, Sarawak and Burma 
(Myanmar) were controlled by the Dutch or British. Western control and 
the head start of Western oil companies in exploration, development, 
transport, reﬁning and petrochemical as well as natural gas industries 
had helped to entrench Western interests there. It would be difﬁcult for 
Chinese oil companies to enjoy equal opportunity in those markets. Chi-
nese oil companies felt compelled to ﬁnd alternative sources of oil.
Africa is believed to be one of the main expanding sources of future 
global oil supply. The Wall Street Journal predicted that by 2010 'West 
Africa will be the world's number one oil source outside of OPEC' (Ball 
2005). Africa's oil surplus has grown over the past decade and at the 
same time the light, sweet crudes of West Africa are well suited to Chi-
na's reﬁneries. Unlike the Middle East, African oil upstream markets are 
open to foreign investors. Europe and the U.S. have yet to monopolize 
some of these new oil producers, such as Sudan and Angola.
The U.S. inﬂuence and control over oil in the African region have 
been either weak or counterbalanced by political factors. Some African 
countries, such as Libya and Sudan, had been barred from U.S. energy 
investment and trade. In Libya's case, this was because of its support for 
terrorism and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In Sudan's case 
it was due to egregious human rights behaviour. This situation provided 
China with a unique opportunity to establish a signiﬁcant position in 
one of the few remaining underdeveloped oil regions of the world. 
China is not a newcomer to Africa. China has been playing a sig-
niﬁcant role there for several decades becoming a major actor on the 
African scene in the 1960s and 1970s when, as part of its ideological 
rivalry with the Soviet Union, China supported certain national libera-
tion movements (notably those that were prepared to eschew Soviet 
aid) and some friendly post-independence regimes. As part of this effort 
China provided arms and military equipment and helped build roads 
and railroads. 'Between 1955 and 1977, while many African countries 
were ﬁghting for independence and self-determination, China sold 
US$ 142 million worth of military equipment to Africans. Moreover, 
China opened its universities to over 15,000 African students for free 
education and has consistently supported Africa's development and 
responded to emergencies' (Klare and Volman 2006a). For this and other 
reasons, China cannot be considered as an interloper in Africa. China 
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is a legitimate player with a credible history of supporting African 
development efforts.
Limited opportunities to raise domestic upstream production and 
thin margins on downstream activities3 is another factor compelling 
Chinese oil companies to scour the world for investment opportunities 
and untapped energy reserves. To grow an upstream business there are 
only two options: one is to explore somewhere more risky, the other one 
is to expand through mergers and acquisitions. Following CNOOC's 
aborted bid to acquire Unocal, Chinese ﬁrms see bigger risk in bidding 
for U.S. and European energy ﬁrms than in drilling for oil in Sudan, 
Syria, or Iran, where Western oil companies are either prohibited from 
investing or hesitant to do so out of fear of political risks. 
Chinese oil companies are less concerned that a host country will one 
day decide to nationalize their assets. This is partially because these 
state-owned ﬁrms are new to the game and have yet to endure such an 
ordeal. They also face lower investment hurdles overall and can thus 
accept a higher risk premium. The case of CNOOC's attempted acquisi-
tion of Unocal in 2005 is well known. The smallest of the three Chinese 
oil majors was able to secure US$ 7 billion in cheap state ﬁnancing as 
part of its US$ 18.5 billion bid (Rosen 2007). Another example is CNPC 
whose 2006 proﬁts alone totalled US$ 24 billion (Lee 2007). As CNPC is 
not required to pay dividends to the state and cannot ﬁnd enough new 
outlets for investing the proﬁts, the only alternative is to put the money 
into bank deposits. With less opportunity costs CNPC is more able to 
overcome various investment difﬁculties and can take on a higher risk 
level than BP or Chevron whose shareholders would rather take their 
money and reinvest it elsewhere if the company cannot deliver double-
digit returns (Rosen 2007).
Finally, the success of Chinese oil companies going into Africa should 
also be attributed to concession agreements from some African coun-
tries. With a dramatic fall in foreign direct investment (FDI) after the 
end of the Cold War, the introduction of Chinese FDI was welcomed. 
There is genuine enthusiasm on the part of African governments for 
providing concession agreements for Chinese entrepreneurs investing 
in their countries and opening new business in neglected sectors such 
as the oil industry. 
China's Sudan project is a good example of the country's interest in 
African countries and African resources. Sudan's modern oil industry 
began in 1978. The American company Chevron began oil exploration 
in 1974 in the Muglad Basin. When civil war broke out for the second 
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time in 1984 Chevron abandoned over one billion dollars of private 
investment and sold its interests to a Canadian ﬁrm which formed 
the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). When 
Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir visited China in September 1995 
he expressed the hope that Chinese oil companies could invest and 
explore oil resources in Sudan and so help Sudan to develop its own 
modern oil industry. CNPC conducted a preliminary study of Sudan 
and concluded that the ﬁelds in question were similar, in terms of geo-
logical formation, to China's Bohai Bay region. In 1997 CNPC decided 
to join an oil exploration project in Sudan and bought a 40 percent 
share from GNPOC. The goal of the newly formed company was to 
develop Sudan's oil ﬁeld in the south-central part of the country and 
build a 1500km pipeline to a coastal port facility at Marsa al-Bashair, 
near Port Sudan.
To support CNPC's business in Sudan, in September 1995 the Chi-
nese government signed a framework agreement with the Sudanese 
government agreeing to provide a preferential line of credit amount-
FIGURE 5  Sudan
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ing to Rmb 1.15 billion for oil exploration projects in Sudan (Lin 1997). 
After discussions with representatives from the Financial Ministry and 
Central Bank of Sudan it was agreed that credit would be provided to 
Chinese companies while the project would come under the supervision 
of the Sudan Bank.4 Sudan agreed to give China generous concession 
terms. These included no restrictions on proﬁt reparations and exemp-
tions from all domestic taxes on exported oil. The terms are among the 
most generous in the world. Thus from a purely commercial point of 
view, investment in Sudan was almost too good to turn down, espe-
cially given China's perception that most producing regions were tied 
to U.S., European and Japanese interests and might be less receptive to 
Chinese overtures.
China's Energy Strategy in Africa
China's oil venture in Africa has expanded over the last few years. Since 
1999 crude oil imports from Africa have accounted for over 20 percent 
of total oil imports and in 2005 this percentage was increased to 31 per-
cent (38.47 mts/year). In 2005 Angola, Sudan, Congo and Equatorial 
Guinea were among China's top ten oil importing partners, while other 
oil producing African countries such as Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon 
are increasing their oil exports to China. The growing dependence on 
imported oil from the continent means that China will continue with 
its emphasis on Africa as part of its new energy strategy.
Promoting energy diplomacy 
The Chinese government began giving ﬁnancial support to African coun-
tries in the 1970s. At the outset the objectives of support were largely 
ideological in nature. With the advent of its economic reforms in 1978 
the Chinese government stepped up its diplomatic aid to Africa and 
this assistance began to serve multiple purposes, including economic 
and oil objectives. In recent years the assistance has become both more 
sophisticated, in terms of the instruments utilized and more geographi-
cally diverse. In the 1980s the Chinese government provided much of its 
economic aid in the form of building large non-commercially oriented 
projects such as sports stadiums, hospitals, schools and government ofﬁce 
buildings in Gambia and Sierra Leone, and other countries. In the 1990s, 
support began to shift to grants. Today, the proportion of non-commercial 
aid has been decreasing with commercially oriented loans accounting for 
the vast majority of Chinese government-sponsored African aid.
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China's Export-Import Bank, which was established in 1994 as a state 
policy-bank, is the sole state-owned entity the Chinese government uses 
to dispense ofﬁcial economic aid worldwide, including aid to Africa. 
According to the World Bank, as of 2005 the Chinese Export-Import Bank 
had made an accumulated commitment of US$ 800 million in concession 
loans for 55 projects in nearly 22 African countries and as of mid-2006, 
the total amount of Export-Import Bank loans to Africa reached over 
US$ 12.5 billion in infrastructural development alone (Gill 2007). These 
projects are mainly concentrated in oil-rich countries such as Angola, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In the summer of 2006 a 
US$ 2 billion infrastructure loan was announced during Premier Wen 
Jiabao's visit to Angola as part of a seven-nation African tour (France 
2006). When visiting Africa in early 2006 Chinese president Hu Jintao 
promised to provide preferential credit of US$ 3 billion and that China 
would be a preferential supplier of credit amounting to US$ 2 billion. 
He also announced that China's support for African countries would be 
doubled by the year 2009 (Financial Times 2006). China is also using debt 
relief to assist African nations. Since 2000, Beijing has taken signiﬁcant 
steps to cancel the debt of 31 African countries. In 2000, China wrote 
off US$ 1.2 billion in African debt and in 2003 Beijing forgave another 
US$ 750 million (Broadman 2007: 275).
In past years developing bilateral relations with most African coun-
tries has been a priority for Chinese diplomacy. Most aid has been 
provided using bilateral channels. Now, as China becomes a greater 
player in Africa, it has begun cooperation with multilateral organiza-
tions. China has joined the 'Donor Coordination Groups' based in Kenya 
and Tanzania. China had also started cooperation with NEPAD (New 
Partnership for Arica's Development) in 2003. Development priorities 
in Africa were explicitly discussed with this group. China's role in the 
UN, its contributions to the African Development Bank, and the recent 
conference of African leaders in Shanghai, are testimony to China's 
evolving recognition that a strategy based on international cooperation 
may be more important than one that relies on special arrangements.
Incorporating oil into a broader business regime
Realizing that it did not have the historical linkages with key oil-export-
ing countries enjoyed by U.S. and European multilateral companies, 
China tried to approach Africa not simply as an oil resource base, but 
as part of a greater interdependent business relationship. By the end of 
2005 China had invested in 27 major oil and natural-gas projects in 14 
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African countries, including Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. China will now 
further increase its investment in Africa's oil through its state-owned oil 
companies. In 2006 CNOOC paid US$ 2.7 billion to obtain a minority 
interest in a Nigerian oil ﬁeld and US$ 4 billion to build reﬁneries in the 
same country and Sinopec has paid US$ 2.2 billion for two oil ﬁelds in 
Angola (The Economist 2006). China has also been investing in related 
infrastructure. In Nigeria, China Civil Engineering Construction Corpo-
ration signed a US$8 billion contract in October 2006 to build a 1,315 km 
railway line which will connect the commercial cities of Lagos and Kano 
with the oil cities of Jos and Port Harcourt. In terms of trade, from 2000 
to 2005 bilateral trade between China and African countries increased 
by 40 percent on a year-on-year basis, reaching US$ 36.3 billion in 2005. 
To date China has established trade relations with all African countries 
with over 800 foreign trade companies doing business there.
China believes that modern international oil cooperation should be 
based on a 'win-win' principle. Beijing believes this is the best basis for 
sustainable development and enlargement of oil cooperation. In imple-
menting its 'going out' strategy in Africa, for instance, CNPC focused on 
mutual beneﬁts with resource countries. In the Sudan project nearly 50 
percent of the revenue went to the Sudanese government. CNPC and its 
branches in Sudan have employed over 4000 Sudanese employees and 
over 7000 contract workers greatly relaxing the employment pressure 
in Sudan. Meanwhile, CNPC lays stress on training for its Sudanese 
employees. Since 1998 CNPC has spent US$ 1.5 million on sending 35 
Sudanese students to study at various universities in Beijing.
In developing its relationships with African countries China has 
deliberately avoided a single focus on oil supplies and has attempted 
to enlarge its range of economic exchanges. China's goal is to create a 
level of economic interdependence that will lead to greater trade, in-
cluding the purchase of oil and gas supplies. By the end of 2006 China 
had established over 800 non-ﬁnancial enterprises in Africa, with the 
accumulated value of investment reaching US$ 11.7 billion. The invest-
ment projects cover trade, textile, power generation, road construction, 
tourism and communications. Strategically, these endeavours are meant 
to reinforce Beijing's efforts to establish itself in Africa as a desirable 
long-term customer for the continent's oil exports.
China is negotiating for the establishment of a regional economic 
free trade area with the Southeast African Customs Union and as I note 
above, China has joined the African Development Bank. China has also 
joined the Western African Development Bank and has built its more ex-
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pansive engagement in Africa within the FOCAC (Forum on China and 
Africa Cooperation) framework. The third FOCAC summit in Beijing in 
November 2006 stands out from the previous two (2000 in Beijing and 
2003 in Addis Ababa) for its exuberance, scale and ambition. Meanwhile, 
China has established mechanisms, such as bilateral committees between 
China and African countries and political consultation between foreign 
ministries in order to conduct dialogue and consultation in a ﬂexible 
and pragmatic manner. All these indicate that Beijing has launched a 
comprehensive and ambitious program aimed at courting Africa.
Adjusting the approach to Africa
Until last November China actively worked to block U.S. initiatives 
at the U.N. Security Council aimed at forcing Khartoum into allowing 
a more robust peacekeeping mission in its Darfur region. China has 
been careful not to endorse U.N. involvement in the domestic affairs 
of the host government without consent. This is a policy that arises 
from the fear that someday such a standard could be used against 
China's own interests. China believed that its activities in Sudan were 
commercial in nature, and doubted foreign intervention would bring 
democracy and justice to that troubled nation. Beijing noted that 'his-
tory has shown that oil-importing countries have little power to effect 
change in many of the world's oil states' (Zha 2006). However, as the 
Sino-African relationship has developed further, China has begun to 
alter this policy.
China's investment interest is now beginning to be jeopardized and 
harmed in Sudan and some other African countries. 'China is ﬁnding it 
more difﬁcult to follow its non-interference policy in Sudan, while also 
ensuring the stability of its investments in the country's oil industry' 
(Wolfe 2007a). Indeed, Beijing does not believe that Khartoum's actions 
will lead to a resolution of the present crisis and this could potentially 
undermine China's investments and oil interests in Sudan. Beijing now 
believes that the only way to maintain stability in the region is for outside 
powers to force a negotiated settlement.
China started to adjust its approach in October 2006 when it voted in 
favor of a bigger UN peacekeeping presence in Khartoum. The larger 
force would buttress a weak African Union force on the ground. On 
his visit to Khartoum this February, Chinese President Hu Jintao told 
al-Bashir that 'Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve this 
problem' (Wolfe 2007b). In May 2007, China announced the dispatch 
of 275 military engineers to help strengthen the international presence 
_______________________________________________________________________ 109
_______________________________________________China-U.S. Oil Rivalry in Africa
in the country. China subsequently appointed Liu Guijin (former Chi-
nese ambassador to South Africa and Zimbabwe) as China's special 
representative for African affairs, indicating that China is loosening its 
'non-interference' policy in certain circumstances. However, there is 
little reason to believe that China will shift toward the isolation policy 
advocated by the U.S. In 2007 China held several meetings with Su-
danese ofﬁcials. They pushed for closer relations and a more 'ﬂexible' 
approach to Darfur. In each meeting China used every opportunity to 
reassure Khartoum that it has not fallen out of favour with Beijing.5 In 
fact China's approach to solving the long-lasting conﬂict in Darfur has 
been to provide comprehensive development assistance, while ﬁnding 
every tactical means possible to persuade al-Bashir's government to 
comply with Western requests. 
Is China's Oil Venture Fuelling Rivalry with the U.S.?
China's increasing oil investment in Africa has aroused the concern of 
some American ofﬁcials. In the past few years another perceived threat 
has arisen: the possibility that China will pre-empt U.S. ﬁrms in the 
development of promising oil ﬁelds and compete with the U.S. for the 
loyalty of local governments. Although not all U.S. ofﬁcials would put 
China in the 'threat' category with respect to African oil there is concern 
over the growing Chinese presence in the region among some in the 
U.S. Congress and the Department of Defence (DOD). For example, 
Representative Christopher Smith of New Jersey told the House Com-
mittee on International Relations in July 2005 that 'China is playing 
an increasingly inﬂuential role on the continent of Africa, and there is 
concern that the Chinese intend to aid and abet African dictators, gain a 
stranglehold on precious African natural resources, and undo much of 
the progress that has been made on democracy and governance in the 
last 15 years in African nations' (Klare 2006b). Another example is the 
view reﬂected in the DOD's 2005 report on Chinese military capabilities. 
The Report's authors note that China's role in African oil could affect 
U.S. policy. They recognize that 'China's growing reliance on imported 
energy, especially oil and natural gas, ''is playing a role in shaping 
China's strategy and policy''. Such concerns factor heavily in Beijing's 
relations with a number of major oil producers including Angola and 
Sudan. Beijing's belief that it requires such special relationships in 
order to assure its energy access could shape its defence strategy and 
force planning in the future' (US DOD 2005). This hints at the belief of 
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the DOD that any such efforts on China's part could pose a challenge 
(even a direct challenge) to U.S. security interests. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that China's quest for oil is bound to lead to clashes 
over energy with the U.S. In truth, the U.S. and China are not really in 
direct conﬂict over many energy issues. Nevertheless, China's search for 
oil is creating a new rivalry with the U.S. over inﬂuence in Africa. If not 
managed prudently and properly, this rivalry might generate bilateral 
friction between the two big powers. 
U.S. policy on African oil
Like China, the U.S. has exhibited an extraordinary interest in African 
oil. In the light of Africa's unique ability to increase its output in the 
years ahead, 'Africa is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources 
of oil and natural gas for the American market' (Klare 2006a). It is pre-
dicted that within the next decade the U.S. will rely on Africa for 20 
to 30 percent of its oil imports. Moreover, the Bush government has 
been seeking to enhance U.S. access to African oil in order to reduce its 
dependence on the ever-turbulent Middle East. U.S., oil imports from 
Africa in terms of total annual oil imports  increased from 16 percent 
in 2000 to 20 percent in 2005, while China's rose from 24 percent to 30 
percent (Table 1). In 2006, the U.S. imported 2.23 million barrels per 
day (bpd) from Africa, slightly higher than that from the Middle East 
(2.22 million bpd). Private-sector engagement is steadily rising con-
centrated in the energy ﬁeld with annual two-way trade reaching US$ 
60.6 billion in 2005, up 36.7 percent from 2004 (Gill 2007).For the most 
part, the U.S. policy regarding African oil is aimed at improving the 
investment climate for American ﬁrms and strengthening the internal 
security capabilities of friendly governments. For instance, to enhance 
U.S. access to African oil the Bush government has sought to expedite 
the removal of obstacles to the participation of U.S. oil companies in 
Libya and Sudan. In February 2004, following a declaration by Libya 
that it would abandon its weapons of mass destruction and comply with 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the White House eased sanctions 
on Libya and announced that 'U.S. companies will be able to buy or 
invest in Libyan oil and products'. This will happen in Sudan as well 
if a peace agreement between the northern government in Khartoum 
and the Sudanese People's Liberation Front takes hold and conditions 
improve in Darfur (Klare 2006a).
The U.S. defence establishment devoted relatively meager resources to 
Africa (in comparison with U.S. military expenditures geared to Europe, 
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Asia and the Middle East). As a result of growing American reliance on 
African oil and the uncertain security climate (partly due to China's grow-
ing inﬂuence there) in the region, the U.S. Department of Defence is now 
paying closer attention to Africa. The largest portion of U.S. aid to Africa 
is being directed to Angola and Nigeria, the leading African oil suppli-
ers to the U.S. Total U.S. security aid to these two countries in the ﬁscal 
years 2004-2006 amounted to some US$ 180 million. This is a substantial 
increase over the previous three-year period. U.S. military engagement 
in Africa has expanded signiﬁcantly, especially in the Horn of Africa, the 
Sahara/Sahelian zone, and the Gulf of Guinea maritime zone. Most of the 
U.S. operations there are directed against terrorism, but the longer-term 
issue is still oil, especially in relation to China (Rogers 2007). 
Reducing China-US Oil Rivalry in Africa 
It is possible for China and the U.S. to confront each other over oil in 
Africa. China's increasing oil investment and trade breakthrough with 
Sudan obviously clashes with the U.S. and its allies' sanctioning of 
Sudan. After all, 'Chinese investments and trade will increase the host 
government's coffers, giving it the ability to buy more arms' (Lee 2007). 
Foreign policy analysts in Washington warned that 'Beijing's strategy 
of ''locking up'' the world's remaining oil supplies through long-term 
purchase agreements and aggressive diplomacy could lead Washington 
and Beijing into a struggle which is described as the 'geopolitics of oil' 
(Business Times Singapore 2007).  Hence, American fears are unfounded. 
While CNPC dominates the oil sector in Sudan, China's National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) are minor actors among foreign investors. They 
lag far behind the International Oil Companies (IOCs) in terms of asset 
value and production. The commercial value of the oil investments in 
Africa of China's NOCs is just 3 percent of all company investments in 
African oil. China's NOCs also produce less oil and gas in Africa than 
most IOCs. In 2006 the total African output of the China's NOCs was 
only about one-third of that produced by the largest foreign producer 
in Africa—ExxonMobil. Although China's NOCs have enough capital, 
they lack the technology necessary to compete with IOCs such as BP, 
ExxonMobil and Shell. This is the case when it comes to some of Africa's 
most desirable blocks including those located in the deep waters of the 
Gulf of Guinea.
Undoubtedly China has been paying costs and even running a risk in 
its oil-related diplomacy in Africa. China has been criticized for doing 
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business with  'rogue states' and labelled as being engaged in a 'new 
colonialism to plunder resources'. The beneﬁts of having relatively un-
contested access to oil supplies may be worth the short-term political 
costs, but these costs will rise as China becomes more involved in the 
international market and they may affect the country's credibility in 
regional and international forums. 
One of the arguments for China's oil investment in Africa is that ac-
quiring oil through direct investment can provide domestic consumers 
with a more secure and less expensive supply of oil than the international 
market. The idea that equity oil enhances energy security is prevalent 
among some Chinese ofﬁcials. However, it seems that the case of Sudan 
cannot efﬁciently support the belief that equity production by China's 
oil companies abroad can guarantee China a supply of oil that is more 
reliable and less expensive than the international market. In the case of 
Sudan, the Khartoum government has claimed that concession terms 
given to CNPC in the late 1990s were overgenerous and there is growing 
talk of renegotiating existing contracts. Meanwhile, the government in 
the South said that it had no interest in dealing with Chinese compa-
nies.6 In addition, the Khartoum government has initiated negotiations 
with Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation with the intent to sell a 
portion of its stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
and has unofﬁcially agreed to sell two new blocks, one to the Romanian 
company Rompetrol, and the other to the Algerian national oil and gas 
company, Sonatrach. It seems that the Sudanese government is looking 
for beneﬁt-balance among foreign investors and that China's position 
of exclusivity is deteriorating.
FIGURE 6  Commercial Value and Production in Africa
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Based on the above assessment, China cannot take it for granted that 
Sudan and other African countries will repay China's oil interests for 
China's restraint in not condemning the conduct of the Khartoum re-
gime. China has invested a large amount of capital with the expectation 
that over a long period of time it will get its money back plus a generous 
rate of return. In case these concessions are renegotiated or expropri-
ated by the Sudanese government or its successors, China may ﬁnd 
that the net value of its returns is far lower than anticipated. Beijing has 
already realized this and doubts whether equity production by China's 
oil companies, as small as it is, can greatly increase the country's energy 
security. If not, why endure the damage to China's image and risk the 
potential conﬂict with the U.S.? This thinking has led China to adjust 
its approach to Sudan. 
China's strategy is 'one of humanitarian and development aid plus in-
ﬂuence without interference, in contrast to the West's coercive approach 
of sanctions plus military intervention' (Qian 2007). Through high-level 
diplomacy, such as Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Sudan in 2007 
and the dispatch of special envoys and multilateral platforms such as the 
United Nations and the China-Africa summit, China has been making 
tactical moves to press the Sudanese government to comply with the 
international community's requests. 
To prevent the potential for conﬂict from becoming a self-fulﬁlling 
prophecy it is important for China and the U.S. to improve mutual 
understanding and expand coordinative relations with each other. 
Politically, China needs to do more than sending peacekeeping troops 
to Sudan. China needs to be more positive in responding to U.S. com-
plaints. Repeating 'noninterference in domestic affairs' as its guiding 
principle for foreign affairs (China still insists so orally at least) is inad-
equate. Economically, Chinese companies could lead the way by giving 
business opportunities to their US partners in markets where Chinese 
companies have better political access. More importantly, China's deci-
sion makers need to keep in mind that energy security is a global issue 
and in an era of globalization a single nation's policy no longer works 
well in addressing oil security. In the future years a strategy based on 
international cooperation may look more attractive than one based on 
special arrangements with a few rogue states.
As far as the U.S. response is concerned it is essential to see that both 
sides share the same view on many controversial issues and understand 
China's situation. As the U.S. President's special envoy to Sudan said, 
'Our policy and Chinese policy (on Darfur/Sudan) are closer than I 
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realized they were and I think the Chinese are going to play an increas-
ingly important role in helping us to resolve this. I think the visit was 
a very successful one because we found many more areas of common 
agreement, both about our objectives and our strategies for achieving 
those objectives' (Natsios 2007). The two sides have obviously become 
deeply intertwined economically and have a joint interest in managing 
their political relationship in a way that assures continued bilateral 
economic and oil interests in Africa.
China's political inﬂuence in Darfur should not be overestimated. At 
the same time as Beijing's investment in Sudan provides economic lever-
age, it also makes Beijing a hostage. China's role is limited. It will lose 
its credibility and inﬂuence if it overreaches its will politically because 
'the effective inﬂuence that Beijing can exert over the Darfur crisis lies 
in its delicate balance between practicing an inﬂuence-without-inter-
ference strategy and maintaining the hard-won trust of the Sudanese 
government' (Qian  2007).
It is evident that China's oil investment in Africa is not a threat, but 
something to be encouraged. It has enlarged the availability of oil in the 
world market. For instance, China's investments and technical assistance 
in Sudan have helped turn the country into an oil exporter. 
The U.S. can play a role in leading China onto the right track by, for 
instance, taking China into the IEA.7 This would turn China's unilat-
eral energy policy into a multilateral one. In other words, it is essential 
for China to be further integrated into the global oil market by being 
FIGURE 7  China's Sudanese Oil Production and Imports
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provided with an opportunity to participate in decisions on the  'rules' 
governing that market and sharing information on world oil market. 
China also wants to be assured that its oil interests will be protected in 
the event of turbulence.
Conclusion
As China's engagement in Africa expands economically and politically, 
Beijing continues to focus on Africa as a vital part of the country's en-
ergy strategy. At the November 2006 summit, China announced that 
over the period of 2007-2009 it will establish a US$ 3 billion preferential 
loan package and a US$ 2 billion preferential buyer's credit for African 
countries. It will also double aid to Africa, cancel all debts owed by 
African countries that were due in 2005, and establish a US$ 5 billion 
China-Africa Development Fund to provide start-up capital to Chinese 
companies investing in Africa. But China's activities in Africa have still 
met with unexpected straits and difﬁculties. Although China's invest-
ment in Africa has now been diversiﬁed and China's business strategy 
in Africa has gone far beyond oil and other energy resources, China's 
investment has still been labelled by some Western media as 'new colo-
nialism to plunder resources'. Some Western media reports and concerns 
have not only badly affected China's positive image in Africa, but have 
also made China's oil interests vulnerable to international pressure. 
An example of the above concerns American jurisdiction over compa-
nies listed on the U.S. Stock Exchange. An interpretation of the Alien Tort 
Claim Act was used by human-rights groups to pressure the Canadian 
oil company Talisman Energy to sell its 25 percent share in GNPOC 
(Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company). The share was sold in 
March 2003. CNPC was very interested in a listing on Wall Street, and 
submitted its application in 2000. A listing was expected to raise US$ 10 
billion. However, publicity generated by human-rights activists forced 
a withdrawal of CNPC. CNPC had no choice but to create a subsidiary, 
PetroChina, that explicitly denied that any of the capital raised would go 
to Sudan. In the end, only US$ 300 million was raised (Alden 2005).
China no doubt has its own interests in Africa, but its engagement 
there takes into account the interests of African countries and their de-
sire to ﬁrst of all promote economic development. China has provided 
African countries with some urgently needed aid including concession 
loans and infrastructural development - bridges, roads, dams and power 
plants. However, China has not had due credit for its activities. China 
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needs to consider further reforming its methods for supporting African 
countries and could help them ﬁnd a new development model. Dona-
tions can relieve some urgent needs, but they cannot eradicate the roots 
of poverty and underdevelopment in African countries.
China's economic reform and development can be an example for Af-
rica. China's ﬁnancial system has played an effective role in developing its 
own undeveloped areas. China's reform experience in other ﬁelds includ-
ing relatively advanced technology and some cultural aspects could also 
be emulated by African countries. China, as a leader in economic reform, 
can transfer its expertise in creative development to African countries. 
This would bolster China's image as a constructive and positive partner 
rather than as a colonial power out to plunder resources.
In short, by improving its activities and image as a donor China 
could change Western perceptions of its behaviour in Africa and this 
would greatly reduce potential conﬂicts with the U.S. Both China and 
the U.S. are becoming increasingly dependent on imported energy. As 
such, they are ﬁnding more common interests with regard to oil issues 
in Africa. Both hope to see political and social stability in Africa and a 
stable supply of oil at a fair price on international markets. They have 
the foundation and reason to turn oil and energy in general into an 
exercise in conﬁdence building between them.
Dr Zhao Hong is Professor, Research School of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Xiamen University,  Xiamen, China.
NOTES
1  Equity oil refers to standard industry production sharing agreements where the 
foreign oil company is given the right to sell a speciﬁed share of the oil produced. 
By early 2005, China's total secured equity oil was around 400 thousand barrels per 
day. This was equivalent to roughly 15 percent of China's total crude imports (while 
it makes up over 40 percent of U.S. oil imports) or 6 percent of China's current oil 
consumption.  (http://ksgnotes.harvard.edu./research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/PWPOT-
017/$File/rwp-07.017.lee.pdf)
2  CNPC was incepted in 1988. It is an offshoot of the Ministry of Petroleum Indus-
try, with business operations mainly in the North and the West of China. Sinopec 
(Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation) was established in 1983 after merg-
ing assets from the Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Chemical 
Industry. Its stronger presence is in the South and East. CNOOC (China National 
Offshore Oil Company) was formed as a corporation under the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry in 1982. It focuses on offshore investments.
3  For fear of passing inﬂation to an increasingly automobile-oriented and vocal middle 
class, as well as to low-income farmers and taxi drivers, China has to tightly control 
the gasoline and diesel prices.
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4  In 1994 China began to reform and changed the forms of its foreign aid, combining 
foreign aid with investments, trade and other bilateral cooperation projects (includ-
ing energy cooperation).
5  When visiting Khartoum in February 2007 Hu Jintao provided al-Bashir with an 
interest-free 100 million yuan loan to build a new presidential palace. He also wrote 
off another 70 million yuan in debt.
6  The two sides in Sudan signed a peace treaty in 2005—the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. Under its terms the South has a six-year period of autonomous self-
rule. The South has formed its own oil company-Nilepet, but disputes are already 
emerging about which side has the right to grant concessions for future oil explora-
tion. (Henry Lee and Dan A.Shalmon. 'Searching for Oil: China's Oil Initiatives in 
the Middle East', Faculty Research Working Papers Series, March 2007. Available at: 
http://ksgnotes.harvard.edu./research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/PWPOT-017/$File/rwp-
07.017.lee.pdf)
7  In the near future China is unlikely to join the IEA, which requires membership in 
the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and the main-
tenance of emergency oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports.
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